Objectionable Thick Concepts in Denials by Vayrynen, P
promoting access to White Rose research papers
White Rose Research Online
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
Universities of Leeds, Sheffield and York
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
This is the author’s pre-print version of an article published in Philosophical
Perspectives, 23 (1)
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/76778
Published article:
Vayrynen, P (2009) Objectionable Thick Concepts in Denials. Philosophical
Perspectives, 23 (1). 439 - 469. ISSN 1520-8583
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2009.00179.x
Objectionable Thick Concepts in Denials∗
Pekka Va¨yrynen
University of Leeds
1 Introduction
It is common in moral philosophy, aesthetics, and increasingly in epistemology, to
distinguish between “thick” and “thin” concepts. Concepts commonly regarded as
thick in moral philosophy include honest, courageous, tolerant, cruel, greedy, and
deceitful, those commonly regarded as thin include good and bad, right and wrong,
and ought. We may similarly speak of thick and thin terms, that is, terms that are
typically used to express thick and thin concepts.
Where thick and thin terms or concepts are commonly thought to diﬀer – and
in what the “thickness” of the former is thought to consist – is that thick terms
or concepts have some substantive non-evaluative satisfaction conditions, whereas
thin terms or concepts have little or no such content. For instance, even if things
which involve causing someone pain just for fun count as both cruel and wrong,
the meaning of ‘cruel’ seems to encode this kind of non-evaluative content in a way
that the meaning of ‘wrong’ doesn’t. The distinction seems to mark a diﬀerence
∗Thanks to audiences at University of Leeds, University of Nottingham, and the Thick Concepts
conference at University of Kent, Canterbury, for stimulating discussions, and to Simon Kirchin for
the invitation to speak at the conference. Special thanks are due to Carrie Jenkins, Andrew McGo-
nigal, Robert May, and especially Daniel Elstein and Adam Sennet for helpful conversations, and
to Matti Eklund, Brent Kyle, and Adam Sennet for very useful written comments. I acknowledge
support from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under
grant agreement n표 231016.
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in degree along a spectrum of concepts, rather than a binary distinction in kind
(Scheﬄer 1987: 417). For instance, the non-evaluative demands which terms such
as ‘impartial’ and ‘just’ make on the world for their satisfaction seem to be weaker or
less speciﬁc than those made by ‘cruel’ or ‘courageous’ but stronger or more speciﬁc
than those made by ‘wrong’ or ‘good.’ Even some paradigmatically thin concepts
appear to have some non-evaluative meaning. One example might be ought. The
principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ is widely endorsed, and it is common to think
that ’A ought to 휙’ entails rather than merely implicates ’A can 휙’ and that the
entailment is conceptual rather than merely metaphysically necessary.1
This distinction regarding the non-evaluative contents of the relevant concepts
is usually taken to mark a distinction within the class of evaluative and normative
concepts. (The typical examples in moral philosophy are more clearly evaluative
than they are normative, insofar as there is a clear distinction. I’ll speak of evaluative
concepts, but mainly for the sake of brevity.) Many typical characterizations of the
distinction imply that thick and thin concepts are not merely both evaluative, but
also evaluative in the same kind of way. Hence thick concepts are often taken to
diﬀer in kind from concepts which are used evaluatively but aren’t in themselves
evaluative, such as perhaps pleasant, painful, or athletic.2
It is an attractive thought that concepts such as cruel, brutal, and generous are
evaluative concepts in some way in which thin concepts such as good and wrong are
evaluative. But this shouldn’t be built into the intuitive distinction between thick
and thin concepts or otherwise assumed from the start. This isn’t just because it
isn’t clear what makes a term or concept evaluative to begin with. For no doubt
there is some important sense in which I don’t understand what the critics of wa-
terboarding try to communicate when they say “Waterboarding is brutal,” if I fail
1An interesting further is question whether can individuates ought in the way that the sub-
stantive non-evaluative content of cruel or generous seems partly to individuate them. This might
matter to whether some concepts commonly regarded as thin are to some degree thick.
2See Eklund (ms).
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to grasp that calling things ‘brutal’ is associated with a negative evaluative claim or
attitude. But this doesn’t show that brutal is an evaluative concept. Whether the
kind of understanding one would lack in this sort case is conceptual, substantive, or
something else, and thus whether thick terms are evaluative in meaning or in any
other sense that distinguishes them from terms which are merely used evaluatively,
depends on the way in which sentences containing thick terms convey evaluations.
These initial observations specify two tasks for any account of thick concepts.
One is to identify and explain the evaluative contents that go with thick concepts.
The other is to theoretically locate this evaluative content. For instance, is that
content attributable to thick terms or concepts themselves or to certain of their uses,
and is it conveyed semantically or pragmatically? Further questions concerning the
location of evaluative content will then be whether it makes thick concepts evaluative
in some legitimate sense, and if so, whether it makes them evaluative in the same
kind of way as thin concepts. When I need a neutral placeholder for the relationship
between thick concepts and the evaluative contents they are used to convey, I’ll speak
of evaluative contents “associated with” thick concepts. (This isn’t meant to imply
association in a psychological sense, Freudian or otherwise.)
This paper approaches these tasks by considering “objectionable” thick concepts
(OTCs, for short). Some concepts or words are regarded as objectionable in a
distinctive way. Oscar Wilde was willing to call a certain short story ‘disgusting’
and ‘horrible,’ but declined the suggestion that it was blasphemous with the words
“‘Blasphemous’ is not a word of mine.”3 Those who don’t accept Catholic sexual
morality are unwilling to join the Pope in praising people or their sexual conduct
as ‘chaste’ or condemning them as ‘lustful’ or ‘lewd.’ In fact pretty much any
thick concept seems to be in principle open to being regarded as objectionable. For
instance, certain fundamentalists may regard forgiving or tolerant as objectionable
3The occasion was the 1895 Wilde vs. Queensberry libel trial. A transcript is available
at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/wilde/Wildelibeltranowcross.html
(accessed on July 31, 2009).
3
concepts in a usage which conveys approval. What these examples illustrate is
a refusal to use concepts or words for reasons having to do with their evaluative
dimension.4
Some care is due in getting the phenomenon in focus.5 A concept can be ob-
jectionable for reasons that don’t have to do with its evaluative dimension. For
instance, sinful might be an objectionable concept for reasons having to do with the
theological implications of calling something ‘sinful’ and sexual perversion might be
an objectionable concept insofar as calling something ‘sexually perverted’ involves
an idea of unnaturalness that has no application (Slote 1975). A concept may also
be objectionable only in some types of applications. For instance, many people who
are perfectly happy to call babies and puppies ‘cute’ ﬁnd it objectionable to call
adult women ‘cute’ (Blackburn 1998: 103). But this doesn’t make cute an objec-
tionable concept for reasons to having to do with its evaluative dimension any more
than the sense in which it is objectionable to call the painful deaths of babies ‘funny’
or my coﬀee grinder ‘greedy’ makes funny or greedy objectionable concepts.
The phenomenon of my interest is diﬀerent. Calling something ‘lewd,’ for in-
stance, typically conveys some such evaluative content as that it is at least to some
extent bad or condemnable for having certain sorts of non-evaluative features hav-
ing to do with sexual display. Regarding lewd as an objectionable concept requires
regarding this way of thinking as failing to draw genuine evaluative distinctions –
for instance, regarding things that have the relevant non-evaluative features as in
no way bad so far the possession of those features goes. A concept can then said to
be objectionable if the evaluative content with which it is associated in fact fails in
4I cannot here pursue the interesting question whether thin concepts are open to being regarded
as objectionable in this sense, and if not, why. There are diﬀerent senses in which thin concepts
may be regarded as objectionable. For instance, the claim that the concepts duty and obligation
require a law-giver where there is none is an objection to normative distinctions which presuppose
a certain kind of source, not to any particular grounds for drawing normative distinctions whatever
their source. A similar point would apply to a more general sort of error theory of morality.
5Thanks to Matti Eklund and Brent Kyle for providing care packages here.
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this way to draw genuine evaluative distinctions.
Refusal to use words or concepts one regards as objectionable in this sense seems
only to make sense if the evaluative contents associated with them enjoy a certain
autonomy with respect to the attitudes and intentions of particular thinkers. For
otherwise I should ﬁnd it acceptable to use concepts I regard as objectionable so long
as I don’t endorse or intend to convey the evaluative contents I regard as objection-
able. But that isn’t what we typically ﬁnd. The evaluative contents associated with
thick concepts don’t seem to be easily cancelable in this way. Racial slurs provide
a robust example of expressions which carry objectionable content autonomously
from speaker intentions.6 OTCs seem no diﬀerent in kind (though perhaps they
do in degree) in this respect. For instance, insofar as uttering ‘Pissing on graves
is blasphemous’ conveys that pissing on graves is in some way condemnable for its
irreverence towards something that is considered sacred, it does so irrespective of
whether the speaker intends it to. I’ll assume it as a constraint on accounts of thick
concepts that they account for the autonomy of evaluative content.
The literature on thick concepts often mentions the phenomenon of objectionable
concepts but, I believe, underestimates its signiﬁcance in determining the location
of the evaluative content associated with thick concepts.7 To identify what is at
issue when a thick concept is regarded as objectionable is to identify the evaluative
content associated with it. To specify the way in which the concept is associated
with this evaluative content is to locate it. And since its theoretical location is a
linguistic or conceptual matter, but whether a concept is in fact objectionable is a
substantive matter, the location of evaluative content won’t be sensitive to whether
it is in fact objectionable.8 Its location will be more sensitive to facts about regarding
a concept as objectionable. Since that phenomenon is widespread, results regarding
6See especially Hom (2008).
7Blackburn (1992, 1998) and Gibbard (1992) are honorable exceptions.
8It would be sheer magic if the location of the evaluative content were determined in one way
for all thick concepts which in fact are objectionable and in another way for those which aren’t.
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OTCs may hold with wide generality. There is no reason to expect any theoretically
deep divide between the logic and meaning of OTCs and other thick concepts.
The aim of this paper is threefold. The ﬁrst is to describe some data concerning
how OTCs behave in various kinds of denials. The second is to argue that the
data strongly suggest evidence that thick terms don’t in general have evaluative
content as part of their conventional meaning and mention some consequences that
would seem to follow if that is correct. The third is brieﬂy to assess the strengths
and weaknesses of three other sorts of analysis regarding the location of evaluative
content in explaining the data. All this will take place under two caveats. First,
there is no reason to assume in advance that thick concepts will be homogeneous
with respect to the location of their evaluative content. It might turn out that one
account works best for certain thick concepts, a diﬀerent account for others, and so
on. Second, the data regarding OTCs and the issues it raises are highly complex.
The paper aims not to settle for good what the data regarding OTCs are or show,
but to explore one potentially fruitful approach to evaluative concepts.
2 Objectionable Concepts, Disagreement, and Negation
What sort of disagreement obtains when one speaker regards some concepts of an-
other as objectionable? This question bears on both tasks for accounts of thick
concepts. For to identify the kind of evaluation with which those who regard a thick
concept as objectionable disagree is to identify the evaluative content associated
with the relevant uses of the word or concept. And to identify ways of express-
ing those disagreements is to identify data which hypotheses about the theoretical
location of this content must explain.
If the Pope calls Brad and Janet, an unmarried couple, ‘chaste,’ we know what
he is trying to get across. One thing we know is that if Brad and Janet’s conduct
is to count as satisfying ‘chaste,’ it must have some properties which signal some
kind of dedication to not being sexually provocative. What count as such prop-
6
erties may be a substantive issue that remains unspeciﬁed in the analysis of the
concept. One example of what many who go in for this kind of talk would regard
as paradigmatically chaste might be abstinence from extramarital sex, but the mat-
ter can be controversial among them. Some might think that the relevant kind of
dedication requires abstinence even in thought and desire. Even so, there might be
non-evaluative constraints on chaste which will be common meaning between those
who regard chaste as objectionable and those who don’t. To keep things simple, I’ll
assume that ‘x signals dedication to not being sexually provocative’ is in the right
neighborhood to be the kind of non-evaluative claim that ‘x is chaste’ entails as a
matter of meaning. But I won’t assume that this predicate is anything like exten-
sionally equivalent to ‘chaste’ or suﬃcient for it to apply, or even that it captures
the full non-evaluative meaning of ‘chaste,’ whether combined with evaluation or
not. There is no reason to suppose that every shade of meaning must be lexicalized
in a way which would yield a term with such properties.9 We may even lack the
resources for dividing between a thick term and some non-evaluative correlate at
the level of semantics.
Another thing we know is that the utterance is in some way associated with
thinking that Brad and Janet’s conduct is good or praiseworthy in a particular way,
for having some properties which signal an appropriate kind of dedication to not
being sexually provocative. Some of us don’t accept this way of thinking about
sexual conduct. So it seems that if I regard chaste as objectionable but the Pope
happily applies it, we have a disagreement that seems substantive. (Neither thinks
we can both be right.) But what is it that the Pope thinks but I deny?
Disagreement can usually be expressed through negation. One might utter things
like (1) or (2) to express disagreement with anyone who thinks otherwise:
(1) Alex isn’t good.
(2) Alex isn’t kind.
9For another discussion with a similar tenor, see Gibbard (1992: 274-8).
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Now granted (1) or (2) might sound odd if not uttered in discourse initially but
in response to someone’s claim that Alex is good, or that he is kind.10 But the
explanation is pragmatic: typically we are expected to supply a reason when we
contradict another speaker. The kind of reason one supplies to support a denial
helps to clarify the focus of disagreement. One kind of ordinary disagreement can
be expressed by amending (1) and (2) along these lines:
(1’) Alex isn’t good. He often lies.
(2’) Alex isn’t kind. He is often heartlessly hurtful of other people’s feelings.
A parallel reply to the Pope’s assertion ‘Brad and Janet are chaste’ would be (3):
(3) Brad and Janet aren’t chaste. They aren’t married but often have sex.
A diﬀerent kind of ordinary disagreement can be expressed by uttering (4):
(4) Brad and Janet aren’t chaste. They abstain from sex but really want it.
(3) expresses the kind of disagreement which someone who knows what Brad and
Janet get up to might be having with someone who agrees what it takes to count as
satisfying ‘chaste’ but has diﬀerent beliefs about Brad and Janet. (4) expresses the
kind of disagreement which speakers who have diﬀerent beliefs about what counts as
satisfying ‘chaste,’ such as a more and a less conservative Catholic, might be having
even if they shared the same non-evaluative beliefs about Brad and Janet.
But clearly neither kind of disagreement is one which those who regard chaste as
an objectionable concept are having over ‘Brad and Janet are chaste.’ They have no
stake in what kind dedication to not being sexually provocative something must sig-
nal to count as satisfying ‘chaste.’ Their disagreement is over the general evaluative
10This diﬀerence matters to my discussion because it bears on who takes the lead in determining
how a word is being used in a particular discourse, and that in turn can matter to what kind of
responses are conversationally appropriate. Thanks to Adam Sennett here.
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dimension associated with chaste. My hypothesis is that the diﬀerences between
ways of expressing disagreement with claims made using concepts people regard
as objectionable and responses to claims with which they disagree but which are
made using one of “their concepts” are relevant to locating the evaluative contents
associated with thick concepts.
Three points of methodology are in order. First, while I won’t directly discuss
whether it is certain words or what they express that is objectionable, I suspect that
what is objectionable with respect to OTCs in the ﬁrst instance is a certain way of
thinking rather than speaking.11 Thus my procedure requires me to assume that
words that express such concepts or representations are related to them in some way
such that linguistic evidence constrains or gives clues to the theoretical location of
evaluative content.12
Second, I’ll assume that the linguistic conventions which determine the meanings
of words that express OTCs, and the mechanisms which determine what is conveyed
by their uses, are not exceptional but probably are the same sorts of conventions
and mechanisms as determine these things for the rest of the language.
Third, when I suggest that some sentence is ﬁne, odd, or one that certain speakers
would hesitate to use, or would display semantic incompetence, or the like, I only
claim that statistical patterns in diﬀerent speakers’ linguistic judgments tend in the
way of these judgments. Since there may be wide variation in these judgments, if
11Of course it also matters what concepts are. For a quick run-through of some diﬀerent notions
of concepts, see Williamson (2007: 13-17, 29-30).
12Much more needs to be said about this assumption. It should accommodate the possibility of
using thick and thin terms non-evaluatively merely to classify things and the observation, due to
Simon Kirchin, that words which are typically used to express thick concepts can be used to make
thin evaluations, as with such interjections as ‘Neat!’ or ‘Wicked!’ (I am inclined to regard these
as mere slang or idiolect meanings; compare ‘Rad!’) A bigger question lurking in the background
which I won’t be able to address here concerns whether the mechanisms of language are such that
words could semantically express genuinely thick concepts. This depends on such issues as whether
the main semantic property is a connection to truth, dividing up possible worlds, or what have you.
9
only because terms may be vague or unclear, sometimes there may be no linguistic
fact of the matter whether, for instance, a particular proposition follows analytically
from a sentence that uses a thick term, or is inconsistent with it, and so on.
Let’s now consider how those who regard chaste as an objectionable concept
could express the kind of disagreement they have with (5).
(5) Abstinence from extramarital sex is chaste.
The lesson of (3) and (4) is that we wouldn’t expect those who regard chaste as an
objectionable concept typically to be willing to express their disagreement with (5)
by uttering either (6) or (7).
(6) Abstinence from extramarital sex isn’t chaste.
(7) Abstinence from extramarital sex isn’t chaste. Chastity requires abstaining
even from thoughts and desires concerning extramarital sex.
Uttering (6) alone may sound odd if uttered in response to (5) rather than initially
to express disagreement with anyone who says otherwise. But uttering some such
expansion as (7) wouldn’t express the right sort of disagreement. What is at stake
between (5) and (7) is the extent of dedication to not being sexually provocative
that something must display to be good or praiseworthy in the relevant particular
sort of way or respect. Those who regard chaste as objectionable have no stake in
this. They think that whether something is chaste or not, it wouldn’t be good in
any way for being so.13 We would typically expect them not to be willing to express
their disagreement with (5) by uttering (6) plus a reason for disagreement which
patterns with (3) or with (4) and (7).
Those who remain unsure that this would be a bad way for those who regard
chaste as objectionable to express disagreement with (5) are invited to consider
whether they would be willing to express disagreement with (8) by uttering (9):
13Similar observations can be found in Gibbard (1992: 281-2).
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(8) The Italian Euro 2008 football team are greasy wops.14
(9) The Italian Euro 2008 football team aren’t greasy wops.
I would expect that the answer is No (unless one uses a certain special tone of
voice).15 OTCs and racial slurs seem parallel in this regard.
Next consider (10) and (11).
(10) #Abstinence from extramarital sex isn’t chaste. Chastity doesn’t reside in
having properties that signal dedication to not being sexually provocative.
(11) Yes, abstinence from extramarital sex is chaste, because it signals dedication
to not being sexually provocative.
(10) seems defective. Whatever else ‘x is chaste’ may conceptually entail, one thing
it does entail is something along the lines of ‘x has some properties that signal
dedication to not being sexually provocative.’ Those who regard chaste as an objec-
tionable concept would, however, typically not be willing to express their agreement
that (5) conceptually entails this condition by uttering (11).
My next group of examples consists of (12)-(14):
(12) Abstinence from extramarital sex isn’t chaste, [but/although] it does signal
dedication to not being sexually provocative.
(13) Abstinence from extramarital sex isn’t chaste; that it signals dedication to not
being sexually provocative doesn’t make it good in any way.
(14) Abstinence from extramarital sex isn’t chaste, because it is in no way good
for signaling dedication to not being sexually provocative.
14Attributed to politician Alun Cairns on http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/7454545.stm.
15The tone of voice one uses when uttering ‘greasy wops’ in (9) can eﬀect a way to express
disagreement with (8) by uttering (9), namely when it eﬀects a metalinguistic use of negation. See
section 3.
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(12)-(14) negate (5). But, in contrast to such expansions of (6) as (7), those who
regard chaste as an objectionable concept should often ﬁnd it acceptable to express
disagreement with (5) by uttering them. Follow-up clauses which merely aﬃrm a
non-evaluative entailment of the assertion need a concessive particle, as in (12).
Follow-up clauses which deny the sort of evaluative content which those who regard
chaste as objectionable take to be associated with it need either a pause, as in (13),
or an explanatory connective like ‘because/since/for,’ as in (14). The same goes
for the variants of (13) and (14) which specify that abstinence from extramarital
sex isn’t praiseworthy in the respect of signaling dedication to not being sexually
provocative. The acceptability of each to those who regard chaste as objectionable
is clearer if ‘not’ and ‘chaste’ are stressed with a rising intonation.
It may bear emphasis that the follow-up clauses in (13) and (14) seem to need
the complexity they display. Abstinence from extramarital sex might be good in
all sorts of ways, such as a way of pleasing the priest, avoiding venereal disease,
or winning Burning for It (imagine a Channel 4 reality show involving unmarried
Catholic couples). But these don’t constitute the evaluative dimension associated
with chaste. Hence it is irrelevant that a simpler follow-up, as in ‘A isn’t chaste,
because it isn’t good in any way,’ might be false. What is being denied by those
who regard chaste as objectionable is that things are good insofar as they have some
properties that satisfy the kind of generic non-evaluative condition that goes with
calling things ‘chaste.’ (What speciﬁcally these properties are may, again, be left
unspeciﬁed in the analysis of the concept.)
Finally consider two examples of what I’ll call “concessive denials”:
(15) Yes, but there is no reason to praise abstinence from extramarital sex just
because it signals dedication to not being sexually provocative.
(16) Abstinence from extramarital sex may well be chaste, but I want to empha-
size that it is in no way good for signaling dedication to not being sexually
provocative.
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The interpretation and acceptability of these examples is the least clear of the
bunch.16 My own inclination is to judge that (15) and (16) can be used by those
who ﬁnd chaste objectionable to express their disagreement with (5) when they are
read as denying the evaluative content the speaker regards as objectionable and
conceding to (5) only some non-evaluative aspect in which the speaker has no stake.
An example would be a reading on which the ﬁrst half of (16), and the ‘yes’ in (15),
echo only the claim that abstinence from extramarital sex signals dedication to not
being sexually provocative but not any claim which (5) may be used to make about
what that takes. But the reading isn’t ad hoc. (7) suggests that disputes among
those who don’t regard chaste as objectionable about whether chastity requires ab-
stinence merely in act, or also in thought and desire, are substantive rather than
semantic. And (12)-(14) suggest that one can direct denial speciﬁcally at the associ-
ated evaluative content. No doubt this reading isn’t always appropriate. Sometimes
it surely is alright to speak concessively for merely pragmatic reasons. Determining
whether some instances of (15) and (16) can be read in this way thus requires pay-
ing attention, among other things, to the interaction between ways to co-ordinate
conversation (by means of such discourse markers as ‘yes, but...’ and other devices
of politeness) and what is said in conversation.
Replies to (5) which pattern after (13)-(16) can be used to describe the relations
of agreement and disagreement which are possible between those who regard chaste
as objectionable and those who don’t. For they can be used to identify just what it
is that the former don’t accept but take to be associated with typical utterances of
(5). In each case the follow-up clause speciﬁes which aspect of an utterance of (5) is
being denied. For instance, uttering variants of (13) and (14) expresses disagreement
with the positive assertions corresponding to their second halves. Such assertions
16Some speakers report that they wouldn’t be willing to say that a claim like (5) is true, but
misleadingly put (e.g. Gibbard 2003: 168). Others don’t ﬁnd this objectionable. How the former
reaction bears on (15) and (16) depends on whether these sentences can at best amount to saying
‘True, but I wouldn’t put it that way’; the latter bears on how bad it would be if they did.
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express evaluative contents in the neighborhood of (17) and (18):
(17) Things are good in a way for having properties that signal dedication to not
being sexually provocative.
(18) Things are praiseworthy to some degree for having properties that signal ded-
ication to not being sexually provocative.
It seems correct that the focus of the disagreement between someone who utters (5)
and those who regard chaste as objectionable lies in the neighborhood of (17) and
(18). I explained above, in connection with (13) and (14), why they seem to need the
complexity they display. If the focus of disagreement is something along their lines,
then the sorts of disagreements which concern objectionable concepts come out as
involving substantive evaluative disagreement and not as (merely) verbal disputes.
The kinds of denials those who regard a concept as objectionable would typically be
willing to issue against the assertions made by those who don’t can thus be treated
as the sort of genuine engagement with the contents of others’ claims which one
would expect to ﬁnd in genuine disagreement.
A ﬁnal observation about these examples before moving on to discuss what they
show is that the non-evaluative implications of OTCs and the evaluative content
associated with them behave asymmetrically in certain respects. For one asymmetry,
compare (19), a variant of (16), and (20):
(19) Abstinence from extramarital sex may well be chaste, although it is in no way
good for that.
(20) #Abstinence from extramarital sex may well be chaste, although it doesn’t
signal dedication to not being sexually provocative.
As noted in connection with (16), there may disagreement as to whether uttering
(19) would be an acceptable way for those who regard chaste as objectionable to
express their disagreement with (5). But (20) is clearly bad: uttering it would betray
14
a failure to grasp that satisfying ‘chaste’ requires having some properties that signal
dedication to not being sexually provocative; here compare (10).
For another asymmetry, consider (12) and (21):
(12) Abstinence from extramarital sex isn’t chaste, although it does signal dedica-
tion to not being sexually provocative.
(21) ?Abstinence from extramarital sex isn’t chaste, although things are good in a
way for signaling dedication to not being sexually provocative.
The second half of (12) concedes to (5) a non-evaluative implication of chaste which
uttering (20) would show a failure to grasp. The second half of (21) concedes to (5)
the evaluative content which those who regard chaste as objectionable don’t accept.
What aspect of (5) could one then be denying on this concessive reading of (21)?
Surely not that which (20) denies. But what then?
3 Evaluative Content and Conventional Meaning
The behavior of OTCs in denials bears on the meaning of thick concepts. The
data make it plausible that if we regard chaste as an objectionable concept, our
objection to (5) isn’t (merely) that it is false. If (5) were false, then (6) should be
non-problematically true, even if uttering it alone would be pragmatically odd. For
the claim that (5) is false can be expressed by applying ordinary truth-conditional
negation: taking p to not-p in this case generates (6). Then there is no reason why
we should be unwilling to express our disagreement with (5) by uttering (6), at least
with some such follow-up as we ﬁnd in (3) or in (4) and (7). Yet typically we are.
Conditionals exhibit the same phenomenon. If our objection to (5) were that
it is false, then conditionals such as ‘If abstinence from extramarital sex is chaste,
then so is refraining from desiring extramarital sex’ should be non-problematically
true, due to a false antecedent. But the truth of such conditionals isn’t something
that those who regard chaste as objectionable are typically willing to grant.
15
These points can be explained as instances of a more general pattern. Truth-
conditional negation and conditionalization are presupposition holes: they take
scope over the assertion that sentence S would have made if uttered, but not other
types of information its utterance would have conveyed, such as presuppositions or
implicatures. Hesitation to express disagreement with (5) by uttering an expansion
of (6) that uses negation truth-conditionally indicates that the evaluative content
associated with chaste projects past presupposition holes. In other words, assertions
of ‘A is chaste’ and ‘A isn’t chaste’ both convey the evaluative content which is asso-
ciated with chaste but not accepted by those who regard it as objectionable. (Such
utterances may also convey that the speaker endorses such an evaluative content
or express a corresponding attitude.) What makes them unwilling to express dis-
agreement with (5) by using negation truth-conditionally is that this would typically
misrepresent their evaluative outlook.17
If those who don’t accept the evaluative content associated with chaste cannot
express their disagreement by applying truth-conditional negation to ‘A is chaste,’
then it doesn’t seem to be part of the conventional meaning of (5) that it has
some such evaluative truth-condition as (17) or (18). For brevity, I’ll put this as
the claim that the evaluative contents associated with thick concepts aren’t truth-
conditional.18 Since my argument only assumes that ‘chaste’ is regarded as objec-
tionable, not that it in fact is objectionable, the argument will apply to any thick
terms which pattern like ‘chaste,’ whether in fact objectionable or not.
The claim that the evaluative contents associated with thick concepts aren’t
truth-conditional aspects of theirs is supported by the behavior of OTCs in denials.
17This is perhaps no surprise, given the autonomy which the evaluative contents associated with
thick concepts seem to enjoy with respect to the intentions and attitudes of particular speakers.
18This is a simpliﬁcation. The evaluative content associated with thick concepts might be a
truth-conditional aspect of theirs, but not solely because of their conventional meaning, if a certain
form of contextualism is true (see section 7). Note also that the claim isn’t that the evaluative
contents associated with thick concepts aren’t truth-apt. For all I say, they might or might not be.
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It ﬁts well with the reading of concessive denials described in section 2. If something
like (17) of (18) were part of the truth-conditions of (5) in virtue of its conventional
meaning, (15) and (16) should sound contradictory. But they don’t, at least not
on the reading in question, and many of those who ﬁnd them somewhat bad won’t
ﬁnd them contradictory. So those who accept this claim must either explain (15)
and (16) in some other way or explain them away.19 Whether such explanations are
always the best merits further scrutiny.
If the evaluative contents associated with thick concepts aren’t truth-conditional
aspects of their, that would also explain why it is hard to read the negation in
(13) and (14) as truth-conditional. Those who regard chaste as objectionable are
typically willing to utter these sentences, but the evaluative content to which they
object would escape from the scope of truth-conditional negation, as illustrated by
examples like (7). So some instances of (5) seem to be such that when speakers
express disagreement with them through some such negation as (13) or (14), the
negation focuses on the evaluative content associated with the relevant utterances
(5) but this evaluative content isn’t part of the truth-conditions of (5).
A better explanation of the data supports the claim that the evaluative contents
associated with thick concepts aren’t truth-conditional aspects of theirs. The expla-
nation is that (13) and (14), as well as (12), involve a metalinguistic use of negation.
While the truth-conditional use of negation is a device for objecting to the propo-
sition expressed by a sentence S, a metalinguistic use is a device for signalling that
there is something wrong with the utterance of S. Metalinguistic negation may be
directed at any number of features of an utterance, including presuppositions, im-
plicatures, and such formal features as intonation, pronunciation, word-formation,
style, and register.20 The range of the phenomenon is evident from (22)-(25):
19For instance, as noted earlier, one hypothesis is that it is alright to say ‘yes’ for pragmatic
reasons, such as that ‘yes, but...’ can be a polite way of coordinating conversations that involve
disagreement.
20The locus classicus on the metalinguistic use of negation is Horn (1989: ch. 6).
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(22) The king of France isn’t bald, because there is no king of France. [Existential
presupposition]
(23) He’s not rich, he’s ﬁlthy rich. [Scalar implicature]
(24) He didn’t call the POlice, he called the poLICE. [Pronunciation, register]
(25) We didn’t [have intercourse/make love] – we fucked. [Word choice, style]
The material in square brackets speciﬁes which feature of a positive assertion cor-
responding to the ﬁrst half of each example is being denied by the sentence.
Why think that (13) and (14) are instances of metalinguistic negation? It is very
plausible that the second half of each focuses the negation in the ﬁrst half of each
speciﬁcally on the evaluative content associated with chaste. We saw that it is hard
to see how that negation could be a truth-conditional negation of an assertion of (5).
Further support for reading it as metalinguistic comes from cases where negation is
indisputably truth-conditional but which aren’t relevantly analogous:
(26) Taylor isn’t a vixen, because although Taylor is a fox, he isn’t female.
(27) Abstinence from extramarital sex isn’t chaste, because although it does signal
dedication to not being sexually provocative, it is in no way good for that.
(26) contradicts ‘Agatha is a vixen,’ and so the negation is truth-conditional, but
(27) needn’t be read as contradicting (5). (27) eﬀectively conjoins (12) and (13). So
if the negation isn’t truth-conditional in (12) and (13), then it isn’t truth-conditional
in (27) either.
If the negation in (13) and (14) is metalinguistic, then there is no reason to think
that something like (17) or (18) is part of the truth-conditions of those utterances of
(5) to which one could object by uttering (13) or (14). Metalinguistic use of negation
is a device for objecting precisely to features of utterances other than their truth-
conditional content. Moreover, the patterns in the sentences that are acceptable
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to speakers who regard chaste as objectionable suggest that this evaluative content
stays inside the negation in (13) and (14).
The hypothesis that these examples are instances of a metalinguistic use of
negation predicts all this, since negation doesn’t function in such uses as a pre-
supposition hole. Rather, it is directed precisely at such features of utterances as
presuppositions, implicatures, and various formal features. Classifying (13) and (14)
as metalinguistic uses of negation is also independently plausible.21 They are nat-
urally glossed as comments on an utterance of (5), to the eﬀect that to represent
something in terms of what is within the scope of negation is to misevaluate in a
systematic way. Utterance commentary is the sort of function that metalinguistic
negation serves.
4 Some Important Consequences
It matters a lot for theorizing about thick concepts in particular and evaluative con-
cepts in general whether the behavior of OTCs in denials shows that the evaluative
contents associated with thick concepts aren’t truth-conditional in the way just dis-
cussed. Writings on the distinction between thick and thin concepts commonly just
assume that evaluative content is part of thick concepts.22 Even if this assumption
isn’t false, it requires defense. If it is false, the consequences cut deep and wide.
The data I have been discussing seem to suggest that the evaluative contents
associated with thick concepts are related to thick concepts diﬀerently from how the
21In reality, the issue is more complicated. For instance, no standard test for metalinguistic
negation is uniformly reliable (see e.g. Carston 1996 and Geurts 1998). But this means that even if
(13) and (14) pass only some of these tests, this doesn’t undermine the metalinguistic explanation.
Another source of support is that (13) and (14) look like “garden-path utterances”: when an
audience reaches the second half, they often realize that in order for the sentence to correctly
understood, they need to go back and reanalyze the negation in the ﬁrst half. Such garden-pathing
and need for pragmatic reanalysis are typical characteristics of metalinguistic negation.
22See e.g. Foot (1958), McDowell (1981), Williams (1985), and Dancy (1995).
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evaluative contents associated with thin concepts are related to thin concepts. In
the case of thin concepts it is trivial that if concept C is evaluative or normative,
then sentences of the form ‘x is C’ conceptually entail that x is good in some way, or
that there are reasons to respond to x in a certain way, or the like. The behavior of
OTCs in denials suggests that many thick terms or concepts aren’t evaluative in this
sense as a matter of their conventional meaning.23 The possibility even remains that
thick concepts aren’t really evaluative at all.24 So a good account of thick concepts
shouldn’t merely explain the behavior of OTCs in denials in way that accounts
for the autonomy that the evaluative contents associated with thick concepts enjoy
with respect to the intentions and attitudes of particular speakers. It should also
determine, in some principled way, whether thick concepts are evaluative in any
sense which distinguishes them from concepts which are merely used evaluatively
and whether thin concepts are evaluative in the same kind of way.
The behavior of OTCs in denials also bears signiﬁcantly on at least two issues
that have been much discussed in the literature on thick concepts. The ﬁrst is that
their behavior suggests that we should be able to imagine someone acquiring and
using concepts like chaste, lewd, or lustful, but later coming to think that in applying
those concepts they were systematically misevaluating. Thus we should be able to
imagine such a person adopting a way of thinking on which the fact that an act
manifests lust isn’t even normally a reason to condemn it, the fact that it involves
passing certain limits on sexual display doesn’t even normally make it in any way
bad, and so on. It doesn’t seem that changing one’s evaluative dispositions in this
way must involve losing the concept, as opposed to continuing to possess it but
not using it. But if so, then the evaluative content associated with thick concepts
wouldn’t seem to be essential to them. And if so, there is no obstacle in principle
for someone who regards some thick concept as objectionable nonetheless to become
23I generalize because the same behavior will be exhibited by many concepts which are regarded
as objectionable by some but in fact aren’t objectionable.
24It seems fair to attribute this kind of view to Hare (1952) and Brower (1988).
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more or less competent in predicting how those who don’t regard the concept as
objectionable would apply it. These claims are controversial in the literature.25 But
the behavior of OTCs in denials seems to weigh in their favor.
The second issue is whether the evaluative and non-evaluative features of thick
concepts form some kind of amalgamated whole or can be divided or “disentangled”
into distinct components.26 This is a murky issue, in part because it is unclear just
what relation this disentanglement is supposed to be. (For instance, is it supposed
to hold analytically or otherwise a priori?) But if the evaluative contents associated
with thick concepts aren’t part of the truth-conditions of claims using such concepts
in virtue of their conventional meaning, then there would seem to be a sense in
which disentanglement is in principle possible. For sentences of the form ‘x is T’
(where ‘T’ is a thick term) would have some truth-conditional content and some
non-truth-conditional content, and their evaluative content would be conﬁned to
the latter sort.27 Thus it seems that those who deny that thick concepts can be
disentangled, at least in any sense to which linguistic evidence is relevant, should
resist the kinds of claims that the behavior of OTCs in denials seems to support.
For that data would seem to provide an argument against their position unless they
can explain the data in some other way or else explain it away.
The behavior of OTCs in denials also bears on whether objectionable concepts
are empty. (This claim often comes up in conversations.) If nothing like (17) or (18)
is entailed by the conventional meaning of ‘A is chaste,’ then ‘A is chaste’ doesn’t
25Those in favor include Gibbard (1992, 2003: 165-8), Blackburn (1992, 1998: ch. 4), Sreenivasan
(2001), and Richard (2008: 30-3). Those against include McDowell (1981) and Williams (1985: chs.
7-8).
26Those in favor include Hare (1952: ch. 7), Blackburn (1992, 1998: ch. 4), and Hurka and
Elstein (forthcoming). Those against include McDowell (1981), Williams (1985: chs. 7-8), and
Dancy (1995).
27Alternatively, if some relevant form of contextualism is true (see section 7), they would have
conventionally determined truth-conditional content and contextually determined truth-conditional
content, and evaluative content would be of the latter sort.
21
mean something like A has properties which signal dedication to not being sexually
provocative, and is good in some way for having them or A has properties which
signal dedication to not being sexually provocative, and is to some degree praisewor-
thy insofar as those properties go. The hypothesis that the conventional meaning of
thick concepts encodes evaluative content in this kind of way predicts precisely that
OTCs are empty. But regarding ‘chaste’ as objectionable only requires thinking that
nothing satisﬁes this kind of condition, not that the condition is part of what ‘chaste’
means. Nor is such an analysis required for saying that the mistake in thinking of
something as chaste involves thinking that things are good or praiseworthy in some
way for signaling dedication to not being sexually provocative.
So how plausible is the claim that OTCs are empty? Concessive denials suggest,
on the reading described in section 2, that those who regard chaste as objectionable
can attribute something true to some utterances of ‘x is chaste,’ namely whatever
it is that uttering (15) and (16) would concede to (5), provided that these speakers
clarify that they aren’t endorsing the evaluative content associated with chaste.
This isn’t what we would expect if OTCs were empty. Nor would we expect to ﬁnd
such speakers unwilling to say things like ‘No one is chaste.’ It also isn’t clear why,
on this kind of analysis, the non-evaluative and evaluative contents associated with
OTCs should exhibit the kinds of asymmetry as we ﬁnd in (19)/(20) and (12)/(21).
A more straightforward problem is that the hypothesis that OTCs are empty
doesn’t by itself provide a satisfactory account of what the problem is with using
objectionable concepts. It seems plain that what is wrong with wielding such con-
cepts as chaste or lustful isn’t merely the sort of fault that is involved in wielding
such empty concepts as phlogiston or Bigfoot. So the former sort of fault isn’t fully
explained by the hypothesis that OTCs are empty.
The most plausible way of developing the idea that OTCs are empty points away
from locating their evaluative contents in the truth-conditions of assertive sentences
that use them. If ‘chaste’ has the above kind of evaluative meaning, then either
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(5) is false or it lacks truth-value. If (5) were false, then instances of (6) which use
negation truth-conditionally should be non-problematically true, contrary to what
we have seen. So the better option would be to say that (5) is neither true nor false,
and similarly for the relevant instances of (6). However, lack of truth-value is most
typically attributed to expressions with false presuppositions. So the claim that (5)
is neither true nor false seems to tend away from the idea that the evaluative content
associated with a thick concept T is a truth-conditional aspect of sentences of the
form ‘x is T’ towards the idea that they presuppose it (see section 5).
It is worth stressing how diﬃcult locating the evaluative contents associated
with thick concepts has become. For what we have seen is that natural assump-
tions concerning evaluative concepts in general and OTCs in particular seem jointly
inconsistent. Suppose lewd is an objectionable thick concept. If lewd isn’t empty,
then there are some truths of the form ‘x is lewd.’ But if lewd is an objectionable
concept, then not everything that is lewd is thereby bad in any way. Thus it seems
that lewd cannot be an evaluative concept in the sense that ‘x is lewd’ conceptually
entails negative evaluative content. In what sense are thick concepts then supposed
to be evaluative, and evaluative in the same way as thin concepts?
At least three types of analysis of thick concepts remain on the table if the
evaluative contents associated with them aren’t truth-conditional in virtue of their
conventional meaning. I only have space for a brief assessment of the respective
strengths and weaknesses of each view against the above constraints. This will
select none as clearly better than others. Hence the discussion to follow is far from
a last word on the theoretical location of the evaluative contents associated with
thick concepts. Much more will remain to be said.28
28One proposal which I won’t discuss is worth mentioning brieﬂy, because it is radical and I don’t
know what to say about it. This is the view that it is indeterminate whether the evaluative content
associated with a thick concept T is semantically or pragmatically associated with utterances or
sentences of the form ‘x is T.’ (Thanks to Carrie Jenkins for suggesting this view to me.) Such
indeterminism may be well-suited to explain the puzzling patterns in the examples of section 2.
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5 Thick Concepts and Presupposition
There are two obvious proposals to consider concerning the theoretical location of the
evaluative contents associated with thick concepts if they really are related to thick
concepts diﬀerently from how the evaluative contents of thin concepts are related
to thin concepts and if they can be denied by a metalinguistic use of negation. The
proposals are that the evaluative contents of thick concepts are presupposed and
that they are implicated.29 In this section I’ll discuss the presupposition analysis.30
The idea that the evaluative content associated with a thick concept T is presup-
posed by sentences or utterances of the form ‘x is T’ is well-suited to capture various
behaviors of OTCs. The reactions of those who ﬁnd chaste objectionable allow that
if (5) presupposes some such objectionable content as (17) or (18), then, under nor-
mal conditions, one can reasonably infer it from either an assertion of ‘A is chaste’
or an assertion of ‘A isn’t chaste’ (read as truth-conditional negation). Similarly, a
natural way for those who ﬁnd chaste objectionable to indicate that they have no
It is puzzling how one can express disagreement with a claim both by using negation and by
using such concessive constructions as ‘yes, but...’ If it is indeterminate whether the evaluative
contents associated with thick concepts are conventionally or pragmatically conveyed, it would be no
surprise if we were inclined to say sometimes that denying those evaluative contents doesn’t involve
contradicting another speaker and sometimes that it doesn’t. Indeterminism can also explain how
thick and thin concepts might be evaluative in the same kind of way. The thought would be that
whichever evaluative features are semantic and pragmatic, these features are either determinately
semantic or determinately pragmatic in the case of thin concepts, but only indeterminately so in
the case of thick concepts. But I ﬁnd it hard to assess indeterminism with any great conﬁdence
because it isn’t clear to me how to assess theories of this general type.
29There may be others. Discussions of such proposals should bear in mind that it may often be
hard to discern whether a particular content is asserted, presupposed, or implicated. It should also
be noted that diﬀerent theorists may variously classify one and the same thing as an implicature
or presupposition.
30For one presuppositional analysis, see Gibbard (1992). The more complex of the two patterns
of “reductive” analysis of thick concepts defended by Hurka and Elstein (forthcoming) embeds an
inference that can (but needn’t) be construed as a presupposition.
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stake in disputes about what sort of sexual conduct counts as satisfying ‘chaste’ is
to say that whether a particular bit of conduct is chaste or not, it wouldn’t be in
any way good for that. Instead of accepting or rejecting any particular claim of the
form ‘A is chaste,’ they demur. Such reactions are to be expected if a claim carries
a presupposition one rejects. Witness (28):
(28) Abstinence from extramarital sex is neither chaste nor unchaste, because
things are in no way good for signaling dedication to not being sexually
provocative.
(28) sounds ﬁne to many ears. A presuppositional analysis predicts that.
A presuppositional analysis can also explain why (12) should sound consistent:
(12) Abstinence from extramarital sex isn’t chaste, although it does signal dedica-
tion to not being sexually provocative.
If negation took broad scope over both the evaluative content associated with (5)
and whatever non-evaluative content it has, (12) should sound inconsistent. One
constraint in deciding what presuppositions to assign to utterances is to avoid incon-
sistency if possible. Hence a presuppositional analysis predicts a reading on which
negation takes scope only over the associated evaluative content. This ﬁts with a
metalinguistic use of negation to plug presuppositions.
Finally, a presuppositional analysis implies an asymmetry between the evaluative
content associated with ‘chaste’ and whatever non-evaluative content is at issue
in utterances like (5), since presumably the latter is non-presuppositional. This
contrast could perhaps be used to explain the asymmetries illustrated by (19)/(20)
and (12)/(21).
A presuppositional analysis has two possible forms, depending on whether eval-
uative presuppositions are regarded as semantic or pragmatic. The diﬀerence is
between anything that is intuitively felt to be a requirement on context (or, “taken
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for granted” by a sentence or utterance), whether triggered conventionally or con-
versationally, and a requirement on context which is conventional.31 A standard way
to characterize this diﬀerence is that a proposition p is a semantic presupposition
of sentence S if p must be true in order for S to be true or false, and that p is a
pragmatic presupposition of S in context c if utterance of S is appropriate in c only
if p is mutually assumed by the speaker and hearers. So pragmatic presuppositions
are restrictions on the common ground: the assumed truth of p is a precondition for
felicitous utterance of S in c. If p is a semantic presupposition of S, then S has no
truth value if p is false, whereas if p is a pragmatic presupposition of an utterance
of S, then the utterance can say something true even if p is false. Desire to allow
that presupposition failure needn’t imply a lack of truth-value has made a pragmatic
approach prevalent.
The thought that thick concepts semantically presuppose the evaluative content
associated with them has diﬃculty with concessive denials. For if (5) had no truth-
value, as it wouldn’t if it had a false semantic presupposition, then one shouldn’t be
conceding anything to it in the way that (15) and (16) seem to do. So a semantic
presupposition view must explain why the reading of concessive denials described
in section 2 is unavailable. If the relevant presuppositions are conversationally trig-
gered, however, then an utterance of (5) can be conceded to have said something
true even if it has a false presupposition.32
Whether the evaluative contents associated with thick concepts should be re-
garded as semantically or pragmatically presupposed depends on how such presup-
positions are triggered and, hence, on what explains their presence. The systematic
patterns we have found in the behavior of OTCs in denials don’t show that their
31See e.g. Stalnaker (1974), Levinson (1983), Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (1990), and Kad-
mon (2001).
32Compare this exchange: A: “Sam doesn’t realize that he is late.” B: “Yes, but he isn’t late.”
What ‘yes, but ...’ indicates is that B denies that Sam is late but agrees that Sam doesn’t think
he is late. Insofar as B’s reply sounds odd, this may simply be induced by presupposition failure.
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evaluative presuppositions would be semantic. Many linguists hold that some pre-
suppositions which work systematically (for instance, the factive presuppositions of
verbs like ‘know’ and ‘regret’) are conversationally rather than lexically triggered,
or even that all are.33 Hence even if thick terms formed a distinct category of
presupposition triggers, on par with deﬁnite descriptions, factive verbs, implicative
verbs, change of state verbs, expressions of repetition and temporal relations, clefts,
stressed constituents, and questions, this alone wouldn’t show that the presuppo-
sitions they trigger are part of the conventional meaning of words or grammatical
constructions.34
The claim that evaluative presuppositions are semantic thus implies that they
can only be triggered lexically by words used to express thick concepts. But it is
unclear what grammatical property of these words would directly create the rele-
vant presuppositions. Ascribing them some additional property just to explain the
presuppositions would seem to be ad hoc. Such theoretical commitments might
nonetheless be tolerable if there were strong independent reasons to think that the
evaluative contents associated with thick terms are presuppositional but not ex-
plained by conversational considerations. But if evaluative presuppositions were to
arise out of general conversational considerations rather than features of particu-
lar contexts, the pragmatic hypothesis might have resources to explain why these
evaluative presuppositions work systematically the way they do and why they en-
joy a certain autonomy with respect to the intentions and attitudes of particular
speakers. So in this respect it might be no worse oﬀ than its semantic cousin.
But explanations of these putative evaluative presuppositions which appeal only to
general conversational principles have yet to be given.
The force of these considerations is twofold. First, if the evaluative contents
33Some: Chierchia and McConnell Ginet (1990). All: Levinson (1983). What is more, even some
pragmatic presuppositions seem to be lexically triggered. See especially Kadmon (2001: ch. 11).
34It should be clear that most words that express thick concepts fall into none of these other
categories of words or constructions which are generally recognized as presupposition triggers.
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associated with thick concepts are presuppositional, then an appropriate explanation
of how these putative evaluative presuppositions are triggered will look diﬀerent
depending on whether the presuppositions are supposed to be semantic or pragmatic.
Second, a satisfactory explanation of neither sort has as yet been given. Whether
such explanations are available remains to be determined. But even if they are
available, any presuppositional analysis will have other outstanding issues.
One general issue concerns the backgrounded character of presuppositions. For
an utterance to be appropriate in a given context, its presuppositions (whether
semantic or pragmatic) should already be part of the common ground. This con-
straint on context manifestly fails in the case of disagreements between those who
regard a given thick concept as objectionable and those who don’t. Often when
this appropriateness constraint fails, it may be easy for the hearers to accommodate
the presupposition.35 But it is equally manifestly not the case that the hearers are
typically willing to accommodate evaluative presuppositions they regard as objec-
tionable, nor can the speaker reasonably expect them to.
This raises two problems. First, a presuppositional analysis predicts that users
of OTCs will knowingly and systematically make conversationally inappropriate
utterances in such contexts. Sometimes this needn’t prevent them from achieving
their conversational purpose, such as when their purpose is rhetoric (for instance,
to exhort or persuade others whom they know to disagree to adopt their view)
or symbolic (for instance, simply to put their opinion on public record, without
any expectation of accommodation). But supposing that this is what is always
going on when one is addressing those who ﬁnd one’s concepts objectionable implies
that speakers’ intentions will vary solely depending on whether they believe that
their hearers regard their concepts as objectionable: genuine engagement only with
the orthodox, only rhetorical or symbolic expression with the unorthodox. What
evidence is there for that? Second, given a presuppositional analysis, a competent
35On presupposition accommodation, see Lewis (1979).
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speaker would know that if no one objects to the use of an objectionable concept,
the speaker and hearer are entitled to assume that all presuppose a certain sort
of evaluation regarding its targets. For the analysis would mark these concepts as
having the purpose of slipping a certain sort of evaluative presupposition into the
common ground. But insofar as most contemporary speakers don’t want certain
words to have such properties, one wonders how those words could have them.36 So
it is precisely OTCs that will be hard cases for a presuppositional analysis of thick
concepts.
Another general issue concerns the relationship between thick and thin concepts.
A presuppositional analysis portrays thick concepts as evaluative in the sense that
they trigger evaluative presuppositions. If thin concepts, too, were evaluative only
in this sense, what would their non-presuppositional content be? A better option for
a presupposition theorist might be to question the idea that thick and thin concepts
are evaluative in the same kind of way. One way to do this would be to point out
that it wouldn’t be a compelling objection to a theory of pejorative expressions if
it implied that pejoratives and thin concepts are evaluative in diﬀerent ways. Why
couldn’t one then simply regard it as a substantive result that thick concepts turn
out to be more like pejoratives than like thin concepts, or that they turn out to
be diﬀerent from both, as the case may be?37 This should make us wonder why it
seems attractive that thick and thin concepts are evaluative in the same kind of way.
Such a similarity isn’t required, for instance, in order for thick concepts to be able
to play many, if not all, of the important roles they have variously been thought
to play in normative ethics, since various non-evaluative concepts, such as hedonic
ones, are sometimes recruited to play those roles as well. This an important issue
36Richard (2008: 21) makes basically this point about racial and ethnic slurs.
37Thanks to Matti Eklund for raising this question. As he notes, someone who takes this line
could explain the appearance of a spectrum from thick to thin by saying that it is indeterminate
whether the borderline cases are thick or thin concepts. Eklund (ms) raises the general issue in the
context of a conventional implicature account of the evaluative content of thick concepts.
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that deserves a much fuller discussion than is possible here, so I’ll leave it as a loose
end. Essentially this reply to the parallel problem is also available for an implicature
analysis of the evaluative contents associated with thick concepts. Hence I’ll now
turn to that suggestion.
6 Thick Concepts and Implicature
The hypothesis that the evaluative contents associated with thick concepts are car-
ried by implicatures comes in two diﬀerent forms, depending on whether the implica-
tures would be conventional or conversational.38 The conventional implicatures of an
expression are part of its conventional meaning, although not its truth-conditions,
whereas conversational implicatures arise from the making of utterances and are
supposed to be calculable from what was said plus a Gricean co-operative principle
and maxims of conversation (Grice 1975: 26-30).
Neither conventional nor conversational implicatures are backgrounded in the
way presuppositions are supposed be, so an implicature analysis avoids that problem
with a presuppositional analysis. The hypothesis that thick concepts conventionally
implicate evaluative contents explains their autonomy with respect to the intentions
and attitudes of particular speakers by treating it as conventionally encoded. But
conversational implicatures may enjoy such autonomy as well if they are appropri-
ately generalized.39 Securing such status for the evaluative contents associated with
38The hypothesis is diﬀerent from, but compatible with, the idea that evaluative terms both
express properties and implicate that the speaker holds certain conative attitudes towards the
bearers of those properties, whether conventionally (Copp 2001) or conversationally (Finlay 2005).
39On generalized conversational implicature, see Grice (1975: 37) and Levinson (2000). For
a recent sophisticated account of conventional implicature, see Potts (2005). Williamson (2009)
defends a conventional implicature analysis of pejorative expressions, but as he notes (2009: 151 n.
14), the relationship between pejoratives and evaluative terms is a large question that I leave open
as well. Simon Blackburn may be best read as suggesting a generalized conversational implicature
analysis of thick concepts. He holds that the evaluative contents associated with thick concepts
aren’t a matter of conventional meaning and can usually be communicated by intonation and tone,
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thick concepts would require giving Gricean derivations of propositions like (17) or
(18) from the asserted content of (5) without appeal to special context.
One problem for the conversational implicature analysis is that conversational
implicatures are supposed to be reinforceable: they allow conjoining a statement
that generates an implicature with an overt statement that says the same as the
implicature without getting any feeling of redundancy.40 But consider:
(29) Abstinence from extramarital sex is chaste, and it is good in a particular way
for signaling dedication to not being sexually provocative.
(30) Some athletes smoke, but not all do.
The second half of (29) sounds redundant, but reinforcing a generalized conversa-
tional implicature in (30) doesn’t.
Things become less clear when we turn to the diagnostics that conventional im-
plicatures are supposed to be detachable but non-cancelable whereas conversational
implicatures are supposed to be cancelable but non-detachable (Grice 1975: 25-26).
Implicature content is cancelable (in Grice’s sense) just in case the same sentence
can be uttered, without linguistic impropriety, without expressing that content.
Insofar as the evaluative contents associated with thick concepts enjoy a certain
autonomy with respect to the attitudes and intentions of particular speakers, many
typical devices for canceling implicatures will often fail to cancel that content. It
is unclear that the ﬁrst half of (16) has the same asserted content as (5), even if it
concedes something to (5), and in many contexts (31) sounds questionable:
but that such eﬀects can nonetheless be predictable (Blackburn 1992: 297-8). It also seems plausible
to read R. M. as an implicature theorist. Hare holds that thick concepts have a “primary meaning”
that is non-evaluative and a “secondary meaning” that is prescriptive or evaluative. But what he
says about this secondary meaning makes it look like either a generalized conversational implicature
or a conventional one (see Hare 1952: 118-22).
40On reinforceability, see Sadock (1978).
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(31) Abstinence from extramarital sex is chaste, but I don’t mean to imply that it
is in any way good for signaling dedication to not being sexually provocative.
The claim that the evaluative content associated with thick concepts is cancelable
in the way conversational implicatures are supposed to be at least requires further
defense.41
Implicature content is detachable just in case the same asserted content can be
expressed in the same context without the implicature, typically by substituting
a diﬀerent but coextensive term for the word carrying the implicature. (Conver-
sational implicatures are supposed to be non-detachable, since they are calculated
on the basis of the whole content of what was said in the given context, not its
linguistic form.) There is no reason to expect that diﬀerent co-extensive terms will
in general be available to substitute for thick terms. But one might still think,
counterfactually, that if (5) had a truth-conditional equivalent that didn’t use the
word ‘chaste,’ that sentence could avoid being associated with (17) or (18). One way
to test the detachability of such evaluative content is oﬀered by the idea that (15)
and (16) avoid such association because they use ‘chaste’ only in inverted commas.
One function of inverted commas is to deny asserted content. The new “friends”
of a lottery millionaire, although he might call them such, aren’t his friends.42 But
41The sense in which conversational implicatures are supposed to be cancelable should be dis-
tinguished from a broader sort of deniability. For instance, the factivity of ‘before’ is deniable in
a certain sense. ‘Sally died before she ﬁnished her thesis’ can be true and felicitous although it
falsely presupposes that Sally ﬁnished her thesis (Kadmon 2001: 210; Potts 2005: 22-4). This
raises the question whether it is possible to utter things like ‘This year’s carnival wasn’t lewd,’ and
not merely as a rhetorical trope, and yet deny that the carnival would have been the worse for it
otherwise (cf. Blackburn 1992). One explanation of how the evaluative contents associated with
thick concepts might be deniable in this way would be the hypothesis that such contents can remain
merely potential rather than actual contributions to context of utterance. It would be satisfying to
see rigorous attempts to develop and assess such suggestions.
42Finlay (2005: 14) makes this point against Copp’s (2001: 35) appeal to inverted commas
to defend the detachability of evaluative attitudinal content from moral terms. Insofar as inverted
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they might also be used to overcome expressive limitations of language. So per-
haps inverted commas could be used in this way to detach the evaluative contents
associated with thick concepts.
Imagine a people called the Bulli, who use the word ‘wumpua’ to praise and
rejoice in acts which we call ‘brutal’ on pretty much those grounds on which we call
things ‘brutal’ (Gibbard 2003: 165).43 Suppose the Bulli and we witness a police
oﬃcer subdue someone about to commit a violent crime and kick him hard when he
is down. It seems we can understand each other without having any neutral word for
the extension of ‘brutal’ and ‘wumpua’ and that we can express our disagreement
with the Bullish claim ‘That arrest was wumpua!’ by saying things like these:
(32) The arrest wasn’t wumpua; it was brutal.
(33) The arrest wasn’t wumpua; arrests aren’t praiseworthy for being unnecessarily
violent.
(34) Yes, the arrest was “wumpua,” but it isn’t praiseworthy for having been un-
necessarily violent.
(32) and (33) seem to involve a metalinguistic use of negation.44 But then it should
be plausible to read also (34) as denying something other than the truth-conditional
content of ‘The arrest was wumpua!’ Yet (34) seems to feature a perfectly acceptable
use of inverted commas.45 So it isn’t clear that inverted commas cannot be used
commas can function to overcome expressive limitations, I doubt the signiﬁcance of Finlay’s quibble
that inverted commas fail to produce a diﬀerent co-extensive term.
43Gibbard uses this example for a diﬀerent purpose and takes ‘wumpua’ and ‘brutal’ to be almost
but not quite co-extensive. But the scenario has a coherent variant in which they are co-extensive.
44A further worry about the conversational implicature view is that the interaction of OTCs
with diﬀerent uses of negation seems systematic and predictable but the behavior of conversational
implicatures under negation is unpredictable, since they are calculated on the basis of the whole
content of what was said in the given context.
45Thus it seems unclear what exactly the right inverted commas reading of (15) and (16) would
be and whether it would conﬂict with the reading described in section 2. This bears on doubts
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to detach the evaluative contents associated with thick concepts. What exactly
this would show in the bigger scheme of things is less clear: at least any lexically
triggered presuppositions are also usually regarded as detachable.
A conventional implicature analysis has trouble with concessive denials. Even if
(15) and (16) don’t sound as natural as the denial of a generalized scalar implicature
in (35), they sound better than the denial of conventional implicature in (36):
(35) A: John had six pints. B: Yes, but in fact he had eight.46
(36) #A: Basil Fawlty is English, therefore he is brave. B: Yes, but his being
English doesn’t imply his being brave.
The only way I can rescue (36) is by extensive pragmatic reanalysis that takes B
to concede the truth-conditional content worded in a way that detaches the conven-
tional implicature, such as ‘Basil Fawlty is an Englishman and he is brave.’ But
hearing (15) and (16) as acceptable seems to require much less radical repair.
The force of these considerations is that the evaluative content associated with
thick concepts displays some features that are traditionally attributed to conversa-
tional implicatures, but also some that are traditionally attributed to conventional
implicatures, and that it isn’t clearly either with respect to yet other features. Hence
neither sort of implicature analysis is a good ﬁt with the behavior of OTCs in de-
nials.47 But even if this problem can be solved by taking issue with the data, any
about whether (15) and (16) constitute the kind of evidence which I suggest they provide.
46The scalar implicature that is denied here is John had exactly six pints.
47These analyses have some plausibility regarding Blackburn’s example of using ‘fat↓’ (‘fat’ pro-
nounced with a sneer) to convey that those with excessive body fat are contemptible (Blackburn
1992: 289-91). Sneer may well have a quasi-conventional or generalized function of conveying con-
tempt. While the status of any particular tone is an empirical matter, it seems that if hearers didn’t
think that the “fattist” idiolect uses sneer to convey contempt, using ‘fat↓’ to convey it would re-
quire more from context than using expressions such as ‘gross’ for this purpose. Incidentally, this
may tell against Blackburn’s claim that fattists could perfectly well jettison ‘gross’ for ‘fat↓’ (1992:
290).
34
implicature analysis will have other outstanding issues.
One issue is that many denials of the evaluative contents associated with thick
concepts are non-contrastive contexts of negation, whereas implicature denials are
typically contrastive, as illustrated by (37) and (38).48
(37) John didn’t have six pints but seven.
(38) I’m not happy, I’m ecstatic.
But consider a contrastive denial like (39):
(39) #Abstinence from extramarital sex isn’t chaste, but rather things are in no
way good for signalling dedication to not being sexually provocative.
(39) sounds markedly worse than such non-contrastive denials as (13) and (14).
Another issue concerns the relationship between thick and thin concepts. As
noted at the end of section 5, here implicature theorists have much the same re-
sources available to them as presupposition theorists.
7 Thick Concepts and Contextualism
Insofar as presupposition and implicature suggestions don’t satisfy, one might recon-
sider the idea that evaluative content is a truth-conditional aspect of claims made
using thick terms. A more nuanced analysis than the one considered in sections 3-4
might say that the conventional meaning of a thick concept T is such that whether
the proposition expressed by a sentence of the form ‘x is T’ has evaluative content
48See Geurts (1998: 279-81). Contrastive negation emphasizes a part of the negated sentence
and contrasts it with a corresponding part in an aﬃrmative statement; one form in English is Not
X but Y. Geurts also claims that presupposition denials are typically non-contrastive. This might
support a presuppositional analysis. But the import of such contrastive examples as ‘Abstinence
from extramarital sex isn’t chaste but prudish’ and ‘The early Almodo´var movies aren’t lewd, they
are exhilarating’ is unclear.
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is determined by context of utterance.49 Factors which determine a context of ut-
terance include who is speaking, when, where, to whom, and with what intentions;
what has been said before; and what presuppositions are being made.50
The form of contextualism which the behavior of OTCs in denials would seem
to require says that contextual factors determine the extension of terms such as
‘chaste’ as follows: on some occasions of use something satisﬁes ‘chaste’ only if it
has properties which signal dedication to not being sexually provocative, whereas
on other occasions of use it satisﬁes ‘chaste’ only if it also is good or praiseworthy
in some way for having those properties.51 So, generalizing, whether a sentence of
the form ‘x is T’ is associated with a certain evaluative content E is determined by
contextual factors, but when the two are thus associated, E is part of the truth-
conditions of the sentence.52 The hope for contextualism is to explain why ‘chaste’
has evaluative content in certain utterances but not others by pointing to relevant
49Literature on the semantics of modal expressions, including deontic modals like ‘ought,’ un-
derstands contextualism more narrowly, as the view that modals are quantiﬁers over possibilities
which include parameters for contextually determined values (such as what possibilities are in the
domain and which of those possibilities are best, in the case of ‘ought’). But few if any terms that
express thick concepts are modal expressions.
50This notion of context of utterance follows Lewis (1979). Other instances of this kind of
contextualist hypothesis are that context determines to whom the word ‘I’ refers (this is determined
by who is speaking) and that context determines how costly something must be to fall within the
extension of ‘expensive’ (this is determined by factors such as whether the speaker or his audience
have just been talking about paper clips, vintage guitars, or health care reform [proposals).
51Contextualism should perhaps also allow the possibility that on some occasions something
satisﬁes ‘chaste’ only if it is bad or condemnable in some way for having those properties.
52At least some thick terms are likely to be context-sensitive also in another way. Many of
them are gradable adjectives (for instance, ‘chaste,’ ‘greedy,’ ‘kind,’ and ‘courageous’) and many
gradables are context-sensitive (for instance, ‘tall,’ ‘loud,’ ‘athletic,’ and ‘expensive’). But the
respect in which gradable expressions typically are context-sensitive only concerns the degree to
which something must exhibit certain qualities to count as satisfying the given term in context. (I
discuss this in the context of thick epistemic concepts in Va¨yrynen 2008.) It doesn’t in any obvious
way concern whether this quality is evaluative in some contexts but not so in others.
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diﬀerences in factors that determine context of utterance. This strategy requires
that context must be able to select evaluative standards or ideals as part of what
determines the extension of thick terms. For what other kind of contextual factors
could determine evaluative truth-conditions?
The most straightforward contextualist explanation of why an ordinary utterance
of (5) is associated with evaluative content is that such content it is part of the
truth-conditions of (5) and that this is because the speaker’s evaluative standards
imply it. This explanation has two ﬂaws. First, it predicts that (5) is true, albeit
relative to standards regarded as objectionable. If (5) were true, the negation in
the ﬁrst half of (13) and (14) should sound at least odd – but typically it doesn’t.
Contextualists might treat the denial of evaluative content in the second half of (13)
and (14) as directed not at the proposition expressed but at the standards which
help determine what proposition is expressed. But it isn’t clear that denials directed
at factors which determine truth-conditions count as instances of metalinguistic
negation. Second, the explanation requires that the relevant standards depend on
the speaker’s attitudes or intentions in such a way that it is possible to shift that
feature of context by making one’s intention to do so suﬃciently explicit. But
many utterances of (5) are associated with evaluative content like (17) or (18) even
if the speaker doesn’t endorse or intend to convey it. So the autonomy which
the evaluatives content associated with thick concepts enjoy with respect to the
intentions and attitudes of particular speakers constrains which contextual factors
the relevant kind of contextualism can allow to determine truth-conditions.
Another contextualist explanation is that ordinary utterances of (5) have no
evaluative truth-conditions: they are true, but relative to context which has no
relevant evaluative factors in play. The ﬁrst problem above applies also to this
explanation, but the potential reply isn’t available to it. Contextualism is also
redundant in it. When (5) expresses a non-evaluative proposition, explaining why
the utterance still conveys evaluative content in those many cases where it plainly
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seems to do so would have to invoke independent pragmatic mechanisms. Finally,
the explanation must apply only in a limited range. If the proposition expressed
by (5) isn’t partly evaluative even when uttered by the Pope to a parish priest
while discussing what Brad and Janet get up to, when is something like (17) or (18)
ever going to be part of the truth-conditions of (5) and not merely pragmatically
conveyed?
Thus it seems that any satisfactory contextualist explanation must appeal to
contextual factors which are either objective or highly selective with respect to the
attitudes of particular speakers.53 The relevant standards might be, for instance,
the correct standards, whatever they may be.54 So something like (17) or (18) is
part of the truth-conditions of (5) only if the correct standards entail it, not simply
because the speaker’s standards do. Disagreement about (5) is then explained as
disagreement in substantive beliefs concerning what the correct standards are.
This contextualist view is also problematic. Either (5) is true, or it is false,
relative to the correct standards. If it is true, then the problems with the ﬁrst
contextualist explanation arise again. But if (5) is false (or taken to be so by
someone who regards chaste as objectionable), then again denials of (5) that use
negation truth-conditionally should sound ﬁne and concessive denials should sound
odd. (16), for instance, should sound odd rather than ﬁne or even unclear, because
if (5) is false, why should one concede anything to it in the way that ‘yes, but...’
constructions seem often to do? The same dilemma arises for other contextualist
variants which either further idealize the speakers’ or hearers’ evaluative standards
or fasten on to various objective contextual factors.
Concessive denials like (15) and (16) raise another problem for contextualism.
Either (5) as uttered in a context has some evaluative content as part of its truth-
conditions or it doesn’t. If it does and concessive denials echo this, then contex-
53‘Highly selective’ because (5) can easily come out as true in many contexts even if the relevant
standards are those given by what really matters to the speaker or by his fundamental ideals.
54The autonomy of evaluative content can allow speaker intentions to determine this.
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tualism predicts that concessive denials are contradictory: they both concede and
deny the evaluative content. And if it does but concessive denials don’t echo this,
then the reply talks past (5) instead of engaging with its content in a way we expect
to see in cases of genuine disagreement. On the other hand, if (5) as uttered in
a context doesn’t have evaluative truth-conditions, then it again becomes unclear
when contextualism is ever going to imply that an utterance of (5) expresses an
evaluative proposition. I can see only two replies available to contextualism. The
ﬁrst is to claim that uttering concessive denials like (15) or (16) can retrospectively
shift the context of the previous utterance of (5) from one where evaluative stan-
dards enter into determining the extension of ‘chaste’ to one where they don’t. Such
a backwards inﬂuence seems mysterious and ad hoc. The second is again to claim
either that concessive denials are too unclear to count as part of the data or that,
if they are, it is alright to speak concessively for pragmatic reasons.
A further problem for contextualism concerns how to predict the readings of
(12)-(14) in which negation takes scope over the evaluative content associated with
‘chaste’ but not its non-evaluative implications. According to contextualism, utter-
ance of (5) sometimes expresses some such evaluative proposition as (40):
(40) Abstinence from extramarital sex has properties which signal dedication to not
being sexually provocative, and things are good in a certain way for having
those properties.
When (5) expresses a proposition like (40), negation is naturally read as taking
scope over the whole proposition. For the entailments of a sentence are generally
not preserved under negation. But if so, then (12), which concedes to (5) a certain
non-evaluative entailment of (5), should sound at least odd, and the second half of
(13) and (14) should sound redundant. Neither prediction is borne out by the data
I have been pointing to.
Another further problem is that contextualism seems to contribute little if noth-
ing to explaining the asymmetries illustrated in (19)/(20) and (12)/(21) between the
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evaluative contents associated with thick concepts and their non-evaluative implica-
tions. When (5) expresses a proposition like (40), these contents aren’t asymmetrical
in the relevant way. And when (5) expresses a non-evaluative proposition, any eval-
uative content will be conveyed by some independent pragmatic mechanisms, and
so its behavior won’t be explained by contextualism.
Finally, the present form of contextualism requires some account of the relation-
ship between thick and thin concepts. For although it isn’t implausible that various
thin concepts are context-sensitive in various ways, none seem to be context-sensitive
with respect to whether they have semantic evaluative content at all.
Much more could and has been said about how diﬀerent kinds of contextualism
account for various kinds of disagreement. (The same applies to semantic relativism,
which I haven’t tried to consider here.) But even on the present showing I can
conclude that while the idea that the evaluative contents associated with thick
concepts are contextually determined might explain some of the behavior of OTCs
in denials, many serious problems remain with such contextualism – perhaps more
so than with presupposition and implicature views.
8 Conclusion
This paper raises more questions than it answers. But it shows that theorizing about
thick concepts cannot ignore the way in which thick concepts which are regarded as
objectionable in a certain sense behave in various kinds of denials. Their behavior
suggests that the evaluative contents associated with thick concepts aren’t generally
conceptually entailed by them. It seems to suggest a sense in which the evaluative
and non-evaluative features of thick concepts can be disentangled, without those
evaluative features being essential to them. Their behavior is amenable to rigorous
treatment with tools from the philosophy of language, thereby providing a method-
ologically fresh opening into these much disputed issues in the literature on thick
concepts. And yet, explaining their behavior also turns out to be diﬃcult if those
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evaluative contents are thought of as presupposed or implicated by expressions in-
volving thick concepts or as part of the contextually determined truth-conditions
of such expressions. It is unclear what other options there are for theoretically
locating the evaluative contents associated with thick concepts. Thus, even if the
concepts which are usually classiﬁed as thick may not be homogeneous with respect
to which analysis ﬁts them best, there is a wide and important range of thick con-
cepts which presently lack a satisfactory account. How they are accounted for will
bear consequences for such important issues as whether thick and thin concepts are
evaluative in the same kind of way and what it is for a concept to be evaluative to
begin with. Thus it seems safe to say that the phenomenon of objectionable thick
concepts provides fertile ground for work on evaluative concepts.
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